Admiral Chester Nimitz and the “Silent Service” in World War II

When thinking about the Pacific Theater in World War II, the first image that comes to mind is usually an aircraft carrier and rightly so.  Much of the footage that survives the war involves carriers and planes.  Seeing US carriers moving closer to Japan provided the US public with tangible evidence of progress towards victory.  Submarines could not accommodate reporters or cameras and frequently operated behind enemy lines.  Highlighting their activities was impractical and potentially dangerous.

The Japanese sank most US battleships in the Pacific on December 7, 1941.  Losing the battleship fleet would have proved fatal in an earlier era.  In their first sneak attack in 1904, the Japanese sank Russia’s Asiatic battleship fleet before declaring war.  The Russians never recovered and lost the Russo-Japanese War.  The US Navy did not suffer the same fate because US carriers were not at Pearl Harbor.  

World War II saw the advent of a new form of naval warfare.  Airplanes surpassed battleships as the primary naval weapons, particularly in the great expanse of the Pacific Ocean.  At Pearl Harbor, the Japanese Navy sank or damaged 17 US warships without coming within 50 miles of Hawaii.  Naval ships no longer had to sight each other to inflict destruction.

The shock and destruction at Pearl Harbor threw the US into turmoil.  President Franklin Roosevelt immediately brought in new leadership promoting George Marshall to command of the US Army and Admiral Earnest King to the Navy.  Admiral King needed an efficient problem solver to restore the decimated Pacific Fleet.  He turned to an officer he had known for decades, Chester Nimitz.  King’s choice was not immediately obvious.  Unlike most prominent naval officers, Nimitz was a submariner.  Early in his career he ran a destroyer aground in the Philippines in 1908.  He was reprimanded and shunted to the less prestigious fledgling submarine arm of the Navy.

Submarines have existed for hundreds of years but mostly as a novelty.  Originally powered by hand, they had limited speed and range.  The Industrial Revolution changed that.  In 1863, a Frenchman invented the first steam powered submarine.  The design was impractical and unwieldy underwater but started the ball rolling.  The British invented a self-propelled torpedo in 1866 which eventually gave submarines a lethal weapon.  With electrical engines emerging, better submarine designs came into being, but it was the internal combustion engine and development of batteries that made them practical.  In the 1890s, American John Holland created a submarine that used a diesel engine on the surface and ran on a battery powered electrical engine underwater.  The US purchased Holland’s design in 1900.   

Though the early submarine service had limited opportunities for advancement in the more prestigious surface fleet, Nimitz made the best of the situation becoming an expert on submarines and diesel engines.  Timing and luck was on his side.  By 1913, the Navy wanted to develop diesel engines for surface ships and Nimitz was the best qualified to head up the project.  World War I proved providential as well.  The German Kriegsmarine demonstrated the potency of submarines.  The US Navy began pouring more resources into development and Nimitz benefitted becoming commander of the Pacific submarine fleet which led to several surface fleet commands in the interwar years including command of a battleship division aboard the USS Arizona in the late 1930s.

In 1939, Nimitz received appointment to a desk job with the Bureau of Navigation.  Though he did not relish a non-combat command, being moved off the USS Arizona may have saved his career and life.  The Arizona was sunk at Pearl Harbor with most of its crew.  Even if Nimitz had survived, he likely would have lost his command.  Many officers in office when the Pearl Harbor attack took place were replaced.  As a former submariner himself, new Navy chief Admiral King knew and respected Nimitz’ command abilities and temperament.  He appointed Nimitz to command the Pacific Fleet.

By necessity, Nimitz engaged in a defensive strategy to preserve his warships still afloat while awaiting the arrival of new generations of advanced naval vessels still under construction in US shipyards.  Nimitz focused on low risk raids on Japanese bases and supply lines.  The Japanese became lazy in updating their radio codes which American code breakers deciphered in April of 1942.  Learning that the Japanese planned to invade Midway Island, Nimitz saw his chance.  He deployed his three carriers north of Midway.  Carrier borne planes surprised the Japanese Fleet sinking four of their aircraft carriers and repulsing the invasion.  The loss crippled the Japanese Navy which remained on the defensive for the remainder of the war.

After Midway, the US went on the offensive beginning with the Marine landings on Guadalcanal.  Rather than invade every Japanese occupied island, US forces progressed towards Japan bypassing many of the strongly garrisoned islands.  Japanese troops could be isolated and starved without actually having to fight them directly.  American carriers supported land battles at Guadalcanal, Saipan, Iwo Jima and others.  US industry soon replaced losses with greater numbers of more advanced vessels.  Japan’s smaller, inefficient shipyards with shortages in raw materials could not keep pace.  The decisive victory in the Philippines Sea ended meaningful Japanese naval participation in the war after June, 1944.  Carrier borne aircraft have received due credit for their prominent role, but US submarines made important contributions as well.

By late 1942, advanced Gato Class submarines came into service.  Known as the “Silent Service,” submarines served as scouts for US fleets, raided Japanese supply lines, and hunted stray surface warships.  Submarines began to take a toll on Japanese shipping sinking 180 Japanese vessels, mostly merchant vessels, amounting to 725,000 gross tons in 1942.  Initially submarines suffered from a defective torpedo design which limited early results.  Correcting the defect generated improved the torpedo and its accuracy and lethality.  In 1943, the “Silent Service” took a greater toll sinking 22 Japanese warships and 296 merchant vessels for a total of 1.335 million gross tons.

As the first “stealth” weapons, US submarines could operate where the surface fleet could not: in the waters around Japan and in the supply lanes behind Japanese lines.  As an island, Japan was totally dependent on merchant ships to supply raw materials for the war manufacturing and to feed their population.

Throughout 1944, more submarines, better commanders and improved tactics fundamentally altered the conduct of the war.  US subs began operating in all Japanese supply lanes and in the Japanese home waters.  Supplies slowed to a trickle starving Japanese garrisons and the industrial base.  Japanese occupiers in 1944 morosely joked that they could walk from Singapore to Tokyo by stepping on US periscopes.  The Japanese could neither evacuate nor reinforce their troops.  Remaining Japanese warships and merchant ships were rendered essentially useless by the end of 1944 as US subs interdicted nearly oil supplies from the Asian mainland.

By war’s end, US submarines sank 1,150 merchant ships totaling 4.8 million gross tons representing 45% of the total losses.  The Japanese merchant marine ceased to function by early 1945.  Those vessels not sunk were trapped, they could not risk sailing to or from Japan.  Starvation and lack of essentials rapidly increased throughout the last six months of the war.  The “Silent Service” also sank 201 Japanese warships (27%), more than the 161 sunk by carrier planes.  US subs were so wildly successful, their kill rate actually declined in 1945 for a lack of targets.  See Appendix I below for summary of Japanese losses.

By the end of World War II, Nimitz’ Pacific Fleet had rendered the Japanese Navy irrelevant and halted Japanese war production and supply.  German U-boats often overshadow their US counterparts, but American submarines achieved what the Germans could not against Britain.  Clearly, the submarines could not win the war alone.  US carrier-based fleets provided support for island invasions that subs could not.  However, submarines and Nimitz’ integrated strategy deserves more attention.

Appendix I

Statistics on Losses  Inflicted by US Military Forces on the Empire of Japan in World War II

Sources:

Appendix I: US Naval History and Heritage Command

https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/j/japanese-naval-merchant-shipping-losses-wwii.html

Japanese Zeros over Pearl Harbor courtesy of Google.

The H. L. Hunley by Conrad Wise Chapman courtesy of the Museum of the Confederacy.

Battle of Midway painting courtesy of myfreewallpapers.net

All other photographs courtesy of Wikipedia.

All images in this article subject to Fair Use Laws