The Rupture of George Washington’s and Thomas Jefferson’s Friendship and Its Importance

Author’s Note: When I started this blog I wanted to create concise but informative summaries that were either historically important or just interesting in their own right. As time has passed, I got questions about my conclusions which led to longer articles.   Some like the shorter summary so I am trying something new. I am posting this longer version that provides more insight into how the sausage was made so to speak and also a shorter summary (click here for the shorter article: The Rupture of George Washington’s and Thomas Jefferson’s Friendship and Its Importance [Abridged]). As always, I welcome feedback.  

 

 

In 1800, Thomas Jefferson won an historic victory in the Election of 1800.  The campaign was one of the most bitter and divisive contests in American History and Jefferson began trying to mend fences even before his inauguration.  One of the first things he did was to visit Mount Vernon.  Though George Washington died a year earlier, he remained the most revered figure in America.  Martha Washington cordially received the president-elect on January 3, 1801 but later allegedly said “that next to the loss of her husband, [Jefferson’s visit] was the most painful occurrence of her life.” [1]  A year later, Martha told Reverend Manasseh Cutler that Jefferson was “one of the most detestable of mankind” adding that his election was “the greatest misfortune our country had ever experienced.” [2]

These comments may come as a surprise today.  The success in establishing the United States has eclipsed personal relationships of the founding generation.  Though often forgotten today, those interactions frequently became rivalries which impacted important events and debates.  Martha Washington’s comments were not merely her opinions, they reflected those of her husband.  Washington and Jefferson knew each other for over 40 years and maintained a cordial relationship until the last few years.

That said, for the last two years of Washington’s life, the two men became totally estranged, no longer on speaking terms.  Political differences contributed to the split, but the proximate cause lay in a matter of personal honor; namely publication of Jefferson’s disparaging remarks about Washington’s competence and character.  Washington and Jefferson were not the only Founders whose relationships soured, there were many others.  Understanding how this once close relationship became irrevocably broken provides great insight into early American politics and the complicated relationships of the Founders themselves in forging the early republic.

Forming a New Government and Planting the Seeds of Discord

Creating a democratic republic might have seemed straightforward at the outset.  Americans had essentially governed themselves for over a century in locally elected colonial legislatures.  Added to their governing experience, the Founders possessed a deep understanding of classical Athenian democracy; Roman Republican values; Enlightenment theory on natural rights and law; and British concepts of liberty expressed in the Glorious Revolution.  Out of these common influences, came generalized principles based on individual rights and limited government granted sovereignty by the people.  Putting these ideas into action after the Revolutionary War though proved difficult.

The first effort at applying shared principles of liberty and government produced the Articles of Confederation during the Revolution.  The de-centralized nature of the national government caused problems from the outset.  After the war, the Articles proved fatally inadequate.  Debts accrued from eight years of fighting and internal dissent manifested in events like Shay’s Rebellion (see: Shays’ Rebellion: A Little Revolt with Big Repercussions) exposed the Articles government as feeble and impotent.  Visionaries like James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and others recognized that the US needed a stronger central government to remain intact and viable.

With George Washington’s support, the states sent delegations to Philadelphia in 1787 to reform the Articles.  Instead, the delegates formulated a new governing document, the Constitution.  Each state convened conventions to consider whether to ratify a new direction.  Controversy soon arose between previously united leaders.

Factions grew out of the debates: advocates of the Constitution, known as Federalists, and Anti-Federalists who spoke out against the new government.  Ratification became increasingly difficult as the Anti-Federalists became aware of the provisions.  The Constitution created a more powerful federal government with the power to tax, regulate interstate commerce and disputes, while maintaining a standing army.  Opponents like Patrick Henry, George Mason, James Monroe, Elbridge Gerry and others began forming cogent arguments objecting to what they viewed as unacceptable encroachments on local autonomy and the potential for tyranny. Ultimately, Washington’s backing and his implied promise to serve as president proved the decisive factor. Americans accepted a more potent central government headed by a man universally trusted to not abuse his power or usurp authority.

As Washington came into office, he faced an unprecedented situation. The Constitution laid out only a general framework for the executive branch. Washington knew the offices and procedures he established would shape governmental practices for generations to come.  The new president led in a deliberative manner.  He liked hearing different opinions before reflecting and reaching a decision.  Accordingly, Washington selected cabinet secretaries whom he believed held high intelligence, ability and character without regard to their personal views on the issues.  Among his first secretaries, Washington recruited Alexander Hamilton to head the Treasury Department and Thomas Jefferson as Secretary of State.  These two men differed widely the on the proper role of government and the direction the US should take.  Their disagreements shaped the early debates on policy issues.

Economic Turmoil in Early America

The US economy was in bad shape in 1789.  The states undertook heavy debts during the Revolutionary War.  Some paid off their obligations, but many fell behind.  Some states either declined to make regular payments or issued de-valued paper currency which European creditors refused to accept.  In short, the debts of some states negatively affected the credit of the US as a whole to the point the federal government might not be able to secure future loans.  The lack of mechanisms to generate revenue and manage the economy made the situation worse.

Hamilton studied the situation extensively in the 1780s and came to the Treasury with plans to solve these potentially crippling problems.  He proposed a detailed and systematic solution to address debt, raise revenue, and establish financial institutions to manage the economy.  First, the federal government would assume all state debt to ensure all obligations were paid off in a timely fashion.  Addressing Americans’ poor credit rating gave the US government legitimacy in the eyes of foreign governments.  Additionally, assumption would make whole wealthy Northerners who had taken out loans to finance the war effort.  If their debts were not retired, these powerful Northern interests may not support the union in the future.  Hamilton believed their continued willingness to invest in the union was critical to economic success.

Second, the US government required sources of income.  Taxes in the form of tariffs on imported goods, arriving mostly from Britain, would generate significant revenue.  However, tariffs would not be enough.  Hamilton opted to raise the rest through public debt which he envisioned as a management tool.  Debt structured as long-term interest payments allowed for longer-term payoffs instead of large, unpopular tax hikes.  Bonds allowed speculators to invest in the US, gambling that the government and economy could become stable enough to pay interest and principle.  Bonds would also attract cash from outside the US via foreign investors.

Third, Hamilton proposed establishing the Bank of the United States (BUS) to manage the US economy.  The BUS would be capitalized with $10 million, 20% provided by the government, the rest from speculators.  The bank held responsibility for overseeing bond issuance and interest and principal payments while also managing currency levels and offering loans.  The BUS could loan money to the federal government when necessary and incentivize merchants to invest in factories, commercial shipping, businesses and infrastructure through private loans.  The charter included the power to issue bank notes as a currency as well.

Hamilton’s ambitious financial plans widened the rift originating during the ratification debates over the power and purpose of the federal government.  Much of the outstanding state debt existed northern states.  Southerners had largely paid off their obligations and were not enthusiastic about retiring another region’s debts.  Even more distasteful, it was apparent northern investors would profit disproportionately.  This favoritism was intentional.  Hamilton needed speculators to buy government bonds to pay off the debt.  These same investors would also build factories, fleets and infrastructure fostering a commercial economy.

The more powerful and activist government required to build a commercial economy with vibrant financial markets made the nation’s large farming population uneasy.  Outside of a few northern cities most Americans were small farmers.  They favored a smaller, more passive national government that would not interfere with local autonomy.  Banking and credit ran against farmers’ natural tendency towards self-reliance.  They saw public debt as a mechanism for taxing farmers, to fund northern businesses while filling the pockets of northern speculators.  Not surprisingly, these proposals generated opposition in more agrarian regions.

Out of the loosely organized Anti-Federalists, James Madison slowly formed a cohesive faction in the House of Representatives over assumption of debt.  Jefferson agreed to head the State Department while still serving as an ambassador in France.  By the time he returned to New York in 1790, Congress was already debating assumption.  Jefferson had not yet considered Hamilton’s plans as he later admitted: “I arrived in the midst of it. But a stranger to the ground, a stranger to the actors on it, so long absent as to have lost all familiarity with the subject, and as yet unaware of its object, I took no concern in it.” [3]  With no strong opinions yet formed, Jefferson convened a dinner with Hamilton and Madison to work out a compromise.  Madison agreed to support the assumption of state debts and in exchange Hamilton acquiesced to the establishment of the permanent capital on the Potomac River.

Even though he had brokered the deal, Jefferson became concerned with Hamilton’s plans for the national economy and an activist federal government.  As bills for the BUS and other financial measures matured for congressional consideration, Jefferson increasingly sympathized with Madison’s agrarian faction.  Washington’s support for Hamilton’s initiatives made Jefferson’s position difficult.  He could not openly oppose the ambitious financial plans as a member of Washington’s administration.

Foreign Policy Adds Complications

As his apprehensions grew, so too did Jefferson’s antagonistic relationship with Hamilton.  The rivalry that developed between the Secretaries of State and Treasury took on a personal and philosophical dynamic.  Both men were talented, brilliant and equally certain in the rectitude of their differing visions for America.  Disagreements over domestic initiatives bled into foreign policy.  The US did not exist in a vacuum and the need for foreign loans and trade to sustain and grow the economy meant engagement with Europe.

Two powers in particular loomed large: France and Britain.  For over 700 years, the French and English fought in European wars bound up in larger continentwide struggles for dominance.  With the advent of New World colonies, these battles expanded into Western Hemisphere and elsewhere.  Americans had a unique place in the conflict having fought with the British for control of North America and then with the French to end British rule in the US.  Throughout the 18^th century, the French lost badly though they achieved some measure of vengeance in the Revolutionary War.

The French paid a high price for revenge.  By the conclusion of the Revolutionary War, France’s treasury was empty.  Insolvency led to the toppling of the hereditary French monarchy in 1789.  Americans had high hopes for the French Revolution as a European continuation of the American Revolution.  Jefferson had a personal stake in the outcome. As ambassador to France (1783-1789), he developed an affinity for the French.  He even participated in the French Revolution helping to draft the Rights of Man, a manifesto of liberty intended to transform France from monarchy to democracy.  However, events quickly spun out of control as radical Jacobins seized control imposing a dictatorial oligarchy that descended into the Reign of Terror marked by bloody riots and mass executions by guillotine.

War broke out in 1792 with several European powers attempting to restore the French monarchy.  The French declared war on Britain in 1793 reviving the age-old Anglo-French struggle.  Both sides wanted the US to join them which presented real threats.  Americans held warm feelings of gratitude towards their Gallic allies and had a legal bond of alliance by virtue of the 1778 Treaty.  However, from a practical perspective, aligning with France was problematic. 

Some have attributed the quote “nations have no friends, only interests” to George Washington.  Whether he actually said it or not, the quote accurately describes his guiding principle in foreign affairs.  In his Farewell Address, Washington reviewed his thought process while in office: “There can be no greater error than to expect or calculate upon real favors from nation to nation.  It is an illusion, which experience must cure, which a just pride ought to discard.” [4]

European nations had their own prerogatives, many of which did not coincide with American priorities: “Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none; or a very remote relation.  Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns.  Therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.” [5]  Washington then pointed the folly of a sentimental preference for France: “a passionate attachment of one nation for another produces a variety of evils. Sympathy for the favorite nation, facilitating the illusion of an imaginary common interest in cases where no real common interest exists.” [6]

Siding with the French offered few advantages while fighting the British could have cataclysmic consequences.  For starters, the vast majority of US imports and exports came through Britain and the French lacked the capacity to match the output.  A war with Britain would severely disrupt income flowing from tariffs, wrecking the economy while pitting the tiny US Navy against the British Empire’s powerful fleets.  British colonies in Canada and Caribbean could also serve as bases for invasion.

Additionally, the violence of the French Revolution motivated Washington to maintain a safe distance.  The President feared a close alliance might unleash the radical ideas that subverted French democracy.  He had no desire to see guillotines erected in American town squares.  Economic and military considerations made siding with France foolhardy and dangerous.  Washington had to maintain a delicate balance to avoid being drawn into another war with a European power while still recovering from the last one.  These considerations resulted in Washington’s formal declaration of neutrality in April of 1793.

Jefferson did not wish to side with France in war, but he believed the American Revolution should be true independence including shedding British traditions and reliance.  Jefferson described his version of the foreign relations: “I would wish [the US] to practice neither commerce nor navigation but to stand, with respect to Europe, precisely on the footing of China.” [7]

In examining Washington’s and Jefferson’s views on international relations, the wording of their principles is remarkably similar.  Both favored neutrality and following Americans’ best interests in formulating policy.  The difference lay in their perception of what those best interests were.  Jefferson believed close ties with Britain would create a disproportionate advantage for Britain.  As the more powerful partner, Britain could use its influence to re-conquer the US.

Jefferson’s time as ambassador and involvement in the early stages of the French Revolution instilled a pro-French preference.  France was one of the few republican governments in the world and was fighting for its life against the combined forces of European monarchy. Jefferson shared agrarian dislike for bankers and credit.  Republicans merged their opposition to Hamilton’s financial programs, a commercial economy and close ties with Britain with a pro-French foreign policy.

Jefferson asserted Hamilton was overstepping his bounds in advocating a stronger relationship with Britain.  Foreign policy should be within the purview of the State Department, not Treasury.  Hamilton believed Jefferson’s pro-French preferences threatened American democracy.  Hamilton averred that strengthening ties with France invited war with Britain threatening carefully constructed domestic financial plans.  Domestic and foreign policy could not be compartmentalized, therefore both men were correct in claiming interference by the other.  With such widely divergent worldviews, Hamilton and Jefferson could not get along or agree on a course of action.

The Genet Affair

The French did not help matters by sending Edmund Charles Genet serve as ambassador to the US.  Brusque and uncompromising, Citizen Genet sailed to Charleston on April 8, 1793 shortly after the French declared war on Britain.  His arrival far from the US capital in Philadelphia was intentional.  Genet spent a month trying to raise forces to capture Louisiana for France, commissioning American privateers to raid British shipping and otherwise pushing for the US to take France’s side by any means.  Jefferson backed Genet’s efforts behind the scenes.

In June, the French warship L’Embuscade captured the British merchantman Little Sarah and brought it to Philadelphia to be outfitted as a privateer.  Renamed Petit Democrate, Genet oversaw the addition of 14 cannon and 6 swivel guns.  The Petit Democrate eventually returned to sea and began taking British prizes in or near American waters.

Such activities blatantly violated American neutrality increasing the likelihood of British retaliation.  When admonished for overstepping his authority, Genet arrogantly threatened to go over Washington’s head, making a direct appeal to the American people.  A furious Washington vented his anger to Jefferson by letter: “[Genet acts with] defiance. . .[and] impunity, and then threaten[s] the executive with an appeal to the people?  What must the world think of such conduct, and of the government of the United States in submitting to it?” [8]  

Even the most ardent Republicans could no longer support Genet’s unrepentant belligerence.  Within months of his arrival, the US made a formal request that Genet be recalled.  In the end, Genet sole “success” came in wasting American goodwill towards France.  His overbearing conduct confirmed the sagacity of adherence to neutrality.

With the emergence of factions came newspapers closely tied to one party or the other.  Debates over finance and foreign policy within the halls of government spilled into the public realm in the early 1790s.  John Fenno published the Federalists’ leading paper, The Gazette of the United States featuring the writings of John Adams, Noah Webster, Hamilton and others.  Philip Freneau opened The National Gazette for Republican writers.  Benjamin Franklin Bache, the grandson of Benjamin Franklin, published The Aurora which eventually replaced the Gazette as the leading Republican mouthpiece.

Both sides used the newspapers and pamphlets to advocate for policies and attack their political opponents.  Reluctant to criticize Washington directly, Republicans mostly focused on Hamilton and other Federalists.  A few mild complaints over Washington’s penchant for pomp appeared which critics claimed smacked of monarchism.  These exchanges were relatively mild when compared with those that erupted with the Jay Treaty in 1795.

The Jay Treaty

Washington’s support for Hamilton’s financial plans; fostering the economic relationship with Britain while maintaining distance from France were views also shared by most of the cabinet.  A frustrated Jefferson found himself increasingly marginalized within the administration.  He felt there was little choice but to resign as Secretary of State at the end of 1793.

After Jefferson’s departure, Washington sought to prevent war with Britain by cementing commercial ties.  The timing was good for the US.  At war in Europe, the British had no desire to overstretch limited resources fighting another enemy and US consumers generated much needed revenue in a time of war.  Canada and other British colonies would be vulnerable to American invasion as well.  In other words, the US and Britain had common interests in avoiding war.

Chief Justice John Jay sailed to Britain to negotiate a treaty.  Though Jay did not settle all outstanding matters, he came back with fairly generous terms.  The US received most favored status with Britain, expanding US trade rights to British Caribbean colonies.  The treaty also resolved some issues left open in the 1783 Treaty of Paris such as settling western borders, removal of British troops in US territories and settlement of outstanding debts.

Dismay ran high amongst Republicans when they learned of the treaty terms.  For Republicans, the Jay Treaty meant abandoning the French at the cost of making the US a puppet of the British.  Though the Reign of Terror and Genet’s activities tempered American enthusiasm for the French cause, the Jay Treaty was unpopular with the American people.  The debates that followed hardened the positions of both factions into two camps that came to define American politics for the next decade.  In the long run the treaty’s unpopularity increased the number of Republican voters which would aid Jefferson in 1800.

Opposition to the Jay Treaty led to a more organized Republicans Party.

Republican opposition through newspapers and pamphlets intensified sparking a war of words.  The bitter vitriol often descended into character assassination, straying from fact into conspiracy theory.  Both sides believed the other intended to destroy American democracy with European tyranny.  Republicans charged Federalists with attempting to replicate English monarchy in the US. Federalists claimed Republicans sought to import the French Reign of Terror.

As the Senate considered the Jay Treaty, Republicans ratcheted up the pressure setting their sights on Washington specifically.  Benjamin Franklin Bache’s Aurora ran numerous articles denigrating Washington’s character, intelligence, competency and conduct.  A few excerpts provide a flavor of what Bache printed on a daily basis:

“You seem to have entered life with a mind unadorned by extraordinary features or uncommon capacity. . . [that] emitted none of the sparks of genius, however irregular and inconstant, which mark the dawn of your future eminence. . . . nature had played the miser when she gave you birth; and education had not been lavish in her favors.” [10]

“[Washington’s Administration] is thus the monarch of Great Britain, with some trifling differences . . . with the trappings of royalty, unworthy of any but a lilliptian mind” [11]

Washington introduced pageantry to dazzle the American people to conceal “robbery and . . . foul murder with a glittering veil of tinsel.” The President replaced republican virtues with the “Deity” of money [12]

“[Americans should not give] blind confidence in any man who have done services to their country, [the President] has enslaved and ever will enslave, all nations of the earth.” [13]  

“[Washington] meant to avail himself of the popularity he acquired to strip the people of the rights which they contended for . . . . he ought to be denounced as an ingrate, and held up to public detestation.” [14]

Peppered into these wild invectives were specious calls for impeachment. For example, Pittachus wrote that Washington should be removed from office for making the Jay Treaty without the advice and consent of the Senate; false claims he overdrew his salary in 1793; and for enlisting troops to be stationed in western counties without Congressional approval to put down the Whiskey Rebellion. [15]

Scipio summarized Republican criticisms pretending to offer friendly advice:

“Your situation is like that of a player who has mistaken or lost his part, the longer he persists, the longer he is pelted by the audience, and who would be wiser to retreat behind the curtain at the first instance of general disgust, than to be hissed off the stage.” . . . 

“An immediate resignation, however, might save your country.  The heavy charges of vanity, ambition, and intrigue might lose some proportion of their force” . . . 

“You will never carry this instrument [the Jay Treaty] into effect, unless you call on Great Britain to aid you against the nation.  If you do this your name will forever be classed with [Benedict] Arnold, Dumourier [sic Dumouriez, the French revolutionary general who defected to the royalists and ended up as an advisor to the British] and Robespierre.” . . . 

“Retire immediately; let no flatterer persuade you to rest one hour longer at the helm of state.  You are utterly incapable to steer the political ship into the harbour of safety.  If you have any love for your country, leave its affairs to the wisdom of your fellow citizens . . . there are thousands of them who equal you in capacity and who excel you in knowledge.” [16—see note for additional quoted attacks on Washington]

The largely unmerited criticism does highlight something important from the era: “the shrill editorials of the 1790s reveal the serious political polarities of the 1790s.” [17]  Scipio’s commentary is especially revealing in what Republicans hoped to accomplish.  Calling the President ignorant, greedy, unpatriotic, a murderer and even a traitor akin to Benedict Arnold was intended to force retirement.  The unmerited attacks stung Washington deeply and there is little doubt the unrelenting stream of criticism made leaving office eminently preferable to a third term.

Jefferson’s role is not entirely clear but he was certainly involved.  He had emerged as undisputed leader of the Republican Party by 1796 and was preparing for a presidential run.  Amongst the cascade of criticism, one stood out as especially problematic for Jefferson.  On June 9, 1796, Bache printed a letter from an anonymous writer named “Paulding” which included confidential details from a 1793 cabinet meeting.  Washington frequently formulated questions on important matters for his cabinet to consider.  Paulding listed the questions Washington submitted regarding the merits of declaring neutrality; the legal status of the 1778 treaty of alliance with France; and how to deal with Citizen Genet. Paulding included his own commentary:

“The text needs no commentary.  It has stamped upon it’s front in characters brazen enough for idolatry itself to comprehend, perfidy and ingratitude.  To doubt in such a case was dishonorable, to proclaim those doubts treachery.  For the honor of the American character & of human nature, it is to be lamented that the records of the United States exhibit such a stupendous monument of degeneracy.  It will almost require the authenticity of holy writ to persuade posterity, that it is not a libel ingeniously contrived to injure the reputation of ‘the father of his country.’” [18]

For Washington, an invitation to serve in his cabinet was akin to joining his political family.  He did not mind dissent, but did expect the inner workings of his “family” to remain confidential.  Disclosure of those deliberations would undoubtedly be seen as a personal betrayal.

Jefferson must have been keenly aware that Washington would be angry and immediately wrote to disclaim any involvement.  In a June 19, 1796 letter, Jefferson denied releasing the confidential document in the strongest of terms: “I attest every thing sacred and honorable to the declaration, that it [Washington’s policy questions] has got there neither thro’ me nor the paper confided to me.” [19]

In case there be any thought he might have contributed to the rampant vilification in Republican papers, Jefferson made the broadest possible claim of innocence: “I have formerly mentioned to you that, from a very early period of my life, I had laid it down as a rule of conduct never to write a word for the public papers.  From this I have never departed in a single instance.” [20]  Jefferson then turned to matters of agriculture.  Both men valued their status as farmers and this language was code intended to re-affirm common bonds as gentlemen planters and friends.

Jefferson’s letter is remarkable in the lengths to which he went to deny any culpability.  He had good reason to forestall Washington’s anger.  He was running for president against John Adams in the coming Election of 1796.  Many still revered Washington and a public accusation of betrayal might cripple Jefferson’s campaign.

As usual, Washington took the high road.  He wrote back on July 6^th: “If I had entertained any suspicions before, that the queries Which have been published in Bache’s Paper proceeded from you, the assurances you have given of the contrary, would have removed them; but the truth is, I harboured none.” [21]  Washington went on to identify the parties he believed passed the confidential questions to Bache.  Next, Washington acknowledged rumors that Jefferson had spoken out against him, but he assured Jefferson: “My answer invariably has been, that I had never discovered any thing in the conduct of Mr. Jefferson to raise suspicions, in my mind, of his insincerity.” [22]

Like Jefferson, Washington never responded publicly to anonymous criticism.  However, in the following paragraph, he defended his actions and confided the pain it caused: “while I was using my utmost exertions to establish a national character of our own, . . . wish[ing] . . . to preserve this Country from the horrors of a desolating war, that I should be accused of being the enemy of one Nation, and subject to the influence of another; and to prove it, that every act of my Administration would be tortured, and the grossest, and most insiduous misrepresentations of them be made . . . in such exagerated, and indecent terms as could scarcely be applied to a Nero; a notorious defaulter; or even to a common pickpocket.” [23]

Washington seemed to accept Jefferson’s denial at face value and concluded his letter with friendly discussion of his farming endeavors, a further sign that he still considered Jefferson a friend.  However, historian Don Higgenbotham posed an interesting interpretation: “It is possible, however, to read Washington’s reply differently—to see it as Washington saying to Jefferson, ‘I am on to your machinations.  I don’t believe you, but I am going to hold my temper and behave as a gentlemen, notwithstanding all the provocation from you and your political lieutenants.’” [24]  One might easily conclude Washington did not believe Jefferson.  He may have considered this exchange an opportunity to answer criticisms he knew originated with Jefferson.

Jefferson avoided a public rift with Washington, but still lost the Election of 1796.  Due to the unusual provisions of the Constitution, coming in second made Jefferson vice president even though he ran against Adams.  Jefferson found himself again in the uncomfortable position of holding office in an administration he opposed.  He had no idea that he had already written a letter before Bache’s publication of the confidential questions that would destroy what was left of his relationship with Washington and do him lasting damage.

The Mazzei Letter

Italian born physician and merchant Philip Mazzei came to Virginia in 1773.  He and Jefferson became close friends and neighbors in Charlottesville.  Mazzei helped Jefferson establish the first vineyard in Virginia and in the Revolutionary War, he procured arms for Virginia during Jefferson’s terms as governor.  In an April 24, 1796 letter with the controversy over the Jay Treaty still raging, Jefferson vented his spleen to his Italian friend writing:

“In place of that noble love of liberty and republican government which carried us triumphantly thro’ the war, an Anglican, monarchical and aristocratical party has sprung up, whose avowed object is to draw over us the substance as they have already done the forms of the British government. . . . the Executive, the Judiciary, two out of three branches of the legislature, all of the officers of the government, all who want to be officers, all timid men who prefer the calm of despotism to the boisterous sea of liberty, . . . assimilating us in all things, to the rotten as well as the sound parts of the British model.  It would give you a fever were I to name to you the apostates who have gone over to these heresies, men who were Samsons in the field and Solomons in the council, but who have had their heads shorn by the harlot England.” [25]

Though intended to be private, Mazzei, for reasons unknown, made the letter public in Europe.  Eventually knowledge of the letter reached the US and Federalist Noah Webster published the text in his New York paper Minerva on May 7, 1797.  Federalists seized on the line “Samsons in the field and Solomons in the council, but who have had their heads shorn by the harlot England” as an obvious insult directed at Washington.  Jefferson never publicly acknowledged the letter, but the damage was done. Calling Washington an “apostate” who subverted American liberty to “the harlot England” ended the relationship forever.

Jefferson later claimed that Washington never spoke of the letter as if to imply he did not take the contents personally.  However, Jefferson conveniently avoided acknowledging that Washington never spoke to him again on any subject.  Martha Washington’s description of her meeting with Jefferson confirms Washington’s feelings on his former Secretary of State by the end of his life.

Conclusion

As a postscript, it is worth noting that Washington’s foresight proved sage.  Hamilton’s financial system succeeded in spades in bringing the debt problem under control and in establishing financial institutions to fuel economic growth.  By 1814, even James Madison recognized the value of the BUS when as president he backed extending the bank’s charter for another 20 years.

Further, Washington’s insistence on neutrality and the dangers of war turned out to be correct.  As president, Jefferson allowed the Jay Treaty to expire entering into the Treaty of Ghent with France.  When Madison declared war on Britain initiating the War of 1812, the US was unprepared and the war went badly for the most part.  The British blockaded American ports severely damaging the economy.  To add insult to injury, invading Redcoats captured and burned Washington DC in 1814.  In the long run, the British victory over Napoleon served US interests far better than a French victory would have in opening sea trade routes to American merchants and in fertilizing the American Industrial Revolution. (See: Reassessing the War of 1812).

In spite of the wisdom of Washington’s decisions, they served to strengthen Republican opposition and shift popular support away from the Federalists.  The lingering unpopularity of the Jay Treaty and resulting bitter criticism gave rise to the even more unpopular Alien and Sedition Acts and other events that made John Adams’ re-election untenable.

The Election of 1800 signaled a shift away from Washington and Hamilton’s vision for a pro-British commercial economy supported by an activist government while contributing to the decline and dissolution of the Federalist Party.  Jefferson’s rise to power heralded a new course: Jeffersonian Democracy which favored agrarian interests and a weaker federal government.  The Republican victory was not complete or permanent.  Creating a commercial economy and financial markets laid the foundations for the Industrial Revolution in the northeast.  In the long run, the US has come to resemble more closely Washington’s and Hamilton’s vision.

The Mazzei Letter haunted Jefferson the rest of his life.  Like many important men of his day, Jefferson fretted constantly about his reputation amongst peers and future generations.  No other Founder wrote as much about his recollections and opinions as did Jefferson, mostly after his retirement.  He was fortunate to outlive most of the Founders and structured his writings to vindicate himself and shape history to his favor.  Jefferson thoroughly trashed his old rival Patrick Henry inventing a slanderously false profile of Henry as poorly educated, unwise and lazy that tarred Henry for two centuries (see: Revolutionary Slander: A Personal Grudge in Early American History and the Damage Done).

The “Sage of Monticello” could not do the same to Washington though.  Knowing Washington was too popular, Jefferson tended to be gracious and positive in his later assessments.  In truth, time may have mellowed his opinion as well.  However, a letter by his hand harshly criticizing Washington tarnished Jefferson for posterity and he knew it.  Decades later, he was still protesting his innocence with unconvincing claims his letter was mistranslated. [26]  Washington stood above rancor and partisanship as a near mythological hero.  The Mazzei letter reduced Jefferson to a partisan squabbler, below Washington’s Olympian perch.  That is probably a fitting punishment.

Martha Washington’s words reveal much about the tumultuous first decade of the American Republic and the conflict between founding titans struggling to establish their visions of the course and character of the United States.

 

Footnotes:

[1] Higgenbotham, Don. Virginia’s Trinity of Immortals: Washington, Jefferson, and Henry, and the Story of Their Fractured Relationships. Journal of the Early Republic, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Winter, 2003), p. 541

[2] Ibid, p.

[3] Thomas Jefferson, The Anas of Thomas Jefferson, 1791-1809. p. 82. http://www.archive.org/stream/completeanastho00sawvgoog/completeanastho00sawvgoog_djvu.txt

[4] Washington, George, Farewell Address. 1796. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Peterson, Merrill D. “Thomas Jefferson and Commercial Policy, 1783-1793.” The William and Mary Quarterly 22, no. 4 (1965): 589. doi:10.2307/1922911.

[8] Simpson, Stephen, The Lives of George Washington and Thomas Jefferson: With a Parallel. Philadelphia: Henry Young (1833), p. 137.

[9] Schachner, Nathan, Alexander Hamilton. New York: D. Appleton-Century Co.,(1946), p. 319

[10] Valerius, the Aurora, October, 23, 1795

[11] Ibid.

[12] Pittachus the Aurora, November 5, 1795

[13] Political Creed of 1795, Unsigned, the Aurora, November 23, 1795

[14] Pittachus, the Aurora, September 26, 1795

[15] Pittachus, the Aurora, November 18, 1795. The false claim Washington overdrew his salary first appeared in a letter written under the pseudonym “A Calm Observer” on October 29, 1795 in the Aurora. The baseless claim was repeated subsequently.

[16] Scipio, the Aurora, November 20, 1795. The individual editions of the Aurora can be found by date at this site: https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=t_XbbNNkFXoC&dat=17950930&printsec=frontpage&hl=en

Some other choice quotes:

“The President began his political career as if he had inherited a kingdom—Instead of the deportment and manners of the first Magistrate of a free people.” [Pittachus, the Aurora November 5, 1795]

“[Washington resorted to secret proceedings which were] “secret attempts to cheat the governed [with] dishonesty that shuns the light.” [Political Creed of 1795, Unsigned, the Aurora, November 23, 1795]

“If gratitude alone was to determine our actions, things unjust, and indeed criminal, would be rob’d of their iniquity, and their moral sense would be made to bow.” [Pittachus, the Aurora, September 26, 1795]

“Americans beware how you weaken the force of moral obligation, and give livery to crimes.” [Pittachus, the Aurora, September 26, 1795]

[17] Tagg, James D. “Benjamin Franklin Bache’s Attack on George Washington.” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 100, no. 2 (1976): 194. www.jstor.org/stable/20091053.

[18] Paulding, the Aurora, June 9, 1796

[19] Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Washington dated June 19, 1796. https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-29-02-0091

[20] Ibid.

[21] Letter from George Washington to Thomas Jefferson dated July 6, 1796. https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-29-02-0107

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Higgenbotham, p. 536.

[25] Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Philip Mazzei dated April 24, 1796. https://jeffersonpapers.princeton.edu/selected-documents/thomas-jefferson-philip-mazzei-0

[26] see Jefferson’s 29 June, 1824 letter to Martin Van Buren: https://wallbuilders.com/defending-thomas-jefferson-john-birch-society-v-jefferson/

 

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https://lehrmaninstitute.org/history/FoundingTrio.html

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